Now to the state of the case.

The Russians had, by the end of 1853, the following troops in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia:

http://marxengels.public-archive.net/en/ME1875en.html


1. 4th corps of the army (Dannenberg) three divisions infantry, one division cavalry, four brigades artillery total, after deducting losses, say 45,000 men.
2. Of the 5th corps (Lüders) one division infantry, one division cavalry, two brigades artillery say 15,000 men.

3. 3rd corps (Osten-Sacken) three divisions infantry, one division cavalry, four brigades artillery say 55,000 men.

Total about 115,000 men, besides non-combatants and one division of Lüders' corps in the neighbourhood of Odessa, which, being wanted for garrison duty, cannot be taken into account.

The troops under Dannenberg and Lüders were the only ones that had been in the Principalities up to the beginning of December. The approach of Osten-Sacken's corps was to be the signal for the grand concentration for the attack on Kalafat . His place, on the Bug and the Pruth, was to be filled up by the 6th corps (Cheodayeff), then on the road from Moscow. After the junction of this latter corps, the Danubian army would have consisted of about 170,000 men, but might have turned out to be stronger, if the new levies of recruits from the South Western provinces were at once directed to the theatre of war.

However, 115,000 to 120,000 men appeared to the Russian Commander a sufficient force to defend the whole line of the Danube from Braille to Nicopolis, and spare a sufficient number to be concentrated, from the extreme right, for an attack on Kalafat.

When this movement was commenced, towards the end of December, Kalafat could hardly harbour more than 10,000 to 12,000 defenders, with 8,000 more at Vidin, whose support might be considered dubious, as they had to cross an unruly river in a bad season. The slowness of the Russian movements, however, the indecision of Prince Gorchakoff, and above all the activity and boldness of Ismail Pasha, the commander at Kalafat, permitted the Turks to concentrate some 40,000 men on the menaced point, and to change Kalafat from a simple bridgehead stormable by a force double that of its defenders into a fortification which could shelter at least 30,000 men, and withstand any but a regular siege attack. It has been justly said that the highest triumph for the constructor of a field fortification is the necessity for the enemy to open his trenches against it; if the Russians did not actually open the trenches, it is merely because, even with that extreme means, they did see no way of taking Kalafat in the time they might set apart for the operation. Kalafat will henceforth rank with Frederick II's camp at Bunzelwitz, with the lines of Torres-Vedras, with the Archduke Charles' entrenchments behind Verona, as one of those efforts of field fortification that are named as classical applications of the art in warlike history.[64]

BRING THEM ON

Thanks for the info Hank. Wow! a lot to take in. You are obviously into the Turks Hank. Are you of Turkish origin?

There is a pile more on those early battles along teh Danube River .The towns were repeatedly war zones in 1877 Russo Turk War and even WW2 same names all strageic places to ontrol teh river and coommuncitaions etc.Btw yes we are all Turks.